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I. INTRODUCTION
Children's rights are undergoing an unprecedented expansion in multiple
domains as varied as corporal punishment, deprivation of liberty, rape, partici-
pation, juvenile justice, adoption, abduction, street children, child protection,
and custody-a case law jurisprudence of human rights barely known within
the United States. In particular, two regional human rights courts are cau-
tiously but substantively creating a body of case law developed from the right
of individual petition under human rights treaties that is becoming a new "chil-
dren's common law": the European Court of Human Rights' ("ECHR") and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACHR"). 2 Both enabling trea-
ties are "adult treaties"; they mention children explicitly numerous times,3 but
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I The European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), sitting in Strasbourg, Belgium, was
established by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, ratified today by forty-six nations, which went into effect in 1953. The ECHR
is composed of the number of judges equal to the number of High Contracting Parties, who
are elected for terms of six years and may be re-elected. Article 34 provides that "[tihe
Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of
the rights set forth in the Convention." European Convention on Human Rights, Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No.
11 Rome, art. 34, Apr. 21, 1950 [hereinafter European Convention].
2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACHR"), sitting in San Jos6, Costa Rica,
was established by the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified today by twenty-
five nations, which went into effect in 1978. The IACHR is composed of seven judges who
are elected by the State Parties to the Convention in the General Assembly of the Organiza-
tion for terms of six years and may be re-elected once. The Court is a body of the Organiza-
tion of American States ("OAS"). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is
also composed of seven elected members who represent all member countries of the OAS; it
sits in Washington, D.C. All members of the OAS, including the U.S., are parties to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but only those who have ratified the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights (not the U.S.) are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court.
I For example, Article 19 of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights provides:
"Every minor child has the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a
minor on the part of his family, society, and the state." Organization of American States,
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are focused on the human rights of all persons. Yet a growing cohort of chil-
dren's rights attorneys, NGOs,4 and ordinary lawyers are bringing a rainbow of
cases involving the children's rights to these two courts.
This paper will argue three propositions:
First: Substantive law and standards involving the rights of the child are
being forged through common law analysis and interpretation by the ECHR
and IACHR. Most surprisingly, these courts have incorporated and drawn
upon subsequent treaties, particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"), which does not itself have an individual right of petition.
Second: The ECHR and IACHR are cautiously but significantly re-defin-
ing the paradoxical and contested zone where children's rights meet parental
rights. In this arena the courts have steered away from violating national norms
and traditions, and frequently have affirmed the national holding based on a
margin of appreciation.5 While deferential to the right of parents to serve as
the principal social entity protecting and devoted to children,6 both regional
courts have nonetheless recognized children as human persons and infused their
right to survival, development, life, protection, and participation with new
meanings.
Third: the dynamic and inevitably changing nature of childhood is being
recognized through several specific legal constructs. Specifically, children's
right to participation, effective participation, their right to be heard,7 and their
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 44, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.oas.org. Other references include: provision for the
best interests of the child solely in the case of dissolution of marriage (art. 17(4)), equal
rights for children born out of wedlock (art. 17(5)), prohibition of the juvenile death penalty
(art. 4(5)), separation of juveniles from adults in specialized tribunals in criminal proceed-
ings, so that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors (art. 5(5)), and the
right of parents to provide for the religious and moral education of their children in accor-
dance with their own convictions (art. 12(4)). Id. In contrast, the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms speaks of "no one" and "every-
one," mentioning a "minor" just once in Article 5(l)(d), providing that a minor may be
detained by lawful order for the purposed of educational supervision or bringing him before
the competent legal authority. European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 5(1)(d).
4 Non-governmental organizations.
I The principle of a margin of appreciation includes deference to the nation state, both as
recognition of the decision-makers closest to the ground who know the facts and the people
involved, and of a reluctance to move too far beyond the given law and norms at a particular
moment. See, e.g., Frettd v. France, 36515/97 ECHR § 3, 40 (2002). See also Costello-
Roberts v. United Kingdom, 13134/87 ECHR (1993).
6 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Assembly Reso-
lution 44/25, Nov. 20, 1989, at Preamble ("Recognizing that the child, for the full and har-
monious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in
an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.") [hereinafter CRC]. Or more substan-
tively, Article 5:
State Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights, and duties of parents or, where applicable,
the members of the extended family or community as provided for by the local custom, legal
guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent
with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.
Id. at art. 5.
7 "[T]he opportunity to be heard in any judicial or administrative proceedings affecting the
child." Id. at art. 12(2).
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"right to express their views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views
of the child to be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of
the child"8 are emerging as recognized rights in manifold areas of law and
elevated in the courts' analyses. The courts are integrating this realm of partici-
pation with the overarching principle of best interests of the child9 as the pri-
mary consideration in all actions concerning children. With increasing
frequency courts acknowledge the dynamic factors of age, gender, and develop-
mental capacity as relevant factors in deciding violations of human rights."a
Finally, there will be a concluding discussion about the scope and sub-
stance of rapidly developing areas of law in international human rights courts
and national courts, and their interpretive and instructive" import for chil-
dren's rights attorneys in national courts, including the United States.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: CASES FROM THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Because the ECHR has been functioning for more than five decades, the
cases analyzed below do not represent the full range of decisions involving
children's rights, particularly in the area of domestic relations, custody, and
family law. Here, the discussion will focus on targeted areas of children's
rights, noting particularly the ECHR's recent discussions of children's rights in
relationship to their role in families. Specific areas include juveniles deprived
of their liberty, violence against children (including torture, corporal punish-
ment, and abuse/neglect), and family law as it relates to adoption, abduction,
and visiting or contact with parents.12 Of particular note are the ECHR's grow-
ing references to the Convention on the Rights of the Child as interpretive of
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 13
The ECHR may order damages and costs, and enforceability of the court's
judgments includes both the obligation to put an end to the violation and to
redress its effects, subject to supervision by the European Committee of
Ministers. 14
8 Id. at art. 12(1).
9 "In all actions concerning children ... the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration." Id. at art. 3.
l0 See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey, 57/1996/676/866 ECHR (1997); Selcuk v. Turkey, 21768/02
ECHR § 4 (2006); Pini v. Romania, 78028/01 & 78030/01 ECHR § 2 (2004).
" See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
12 The attorneys who bring cases to these international Courts of human rights appear to be
appellate attorneys or barristers who frequently, although not always, have no direct relation-
ship with the child. Duties of ethical responsibility to the client appear to be based on
national law.
13 See Pini, 78028/01 & 78030/01 ECHR; Selcuk, 21768/02 ECHR. See also Gil v. Spain,
56673/00 ECHR § 4 (2003); Maire v. Portugal, 48206/99, ECHR § 3 (2003).
14 European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 46.
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A. Rights of Children Tried as Adults/Effective Participation and
Sentencing
The sensational British child murder case ("the Bulger case") involved the
abduction of a two-year-old child from a shopping mall by two children aged
ten. The baby, James Bulger, was bludgeoned to death and left on a railroad
track. Appealed to the ECHR, the twin judgments of 1999 are known as T. v.
United Kingdom 5 and V. v. United Kingdom.' 6 The two children were tried as
adults in Old Bailey where they were placed in a specially raised dock for their
three-week trial. The media covered the trial extensively, and hostile crowds
gathered during the transport of the child defendants to and from court, at one
time surrounding and rocking the van in which they were placed. In violation
of British law, the tabloids published the children's names and photos.
The minimum criminal age of responsibility in England and Wales is ten
years, below which no one can be found guilty of a criminal offense. Gener-
ally, children under eighteen are tried in the specialist Youth Court, with infor-
mal procedures and the exclusion of the general public. The exceptions are
those children charged with murder, manslaughter, or an offense punishable by
a sentence of fourteen years or more if committed by an adult; those are tried in
the (adult criminal) Crown Court before a judge and jury.
The ECHR held that the neither the attribution of criminal responsibility
nor the (adult) criminal trial of young children, in and of itself, gave rise to a
violation of the Convention, under Article 3.17 However, the ECHR did con-
clude the requirement of effective participation in the trial mandated that the
trial court take full account of the defendants' ages, levels of maturity, and
intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps be taken to promote their
ability to understand and participate in the proceedings.' 8 In the instant cases,
the young defendants suffered traumatic effects during and after the trial; there
was no serious argument that the boys were able to follow or participate in the
proceedings. The ECHR suggested that appropriate procedures for very young
defendants might include informal procedures such as the judges and barristers
not wearing wigs or gowns, taking frequent breaks, having a social worker sit
with the children to explain the proceedings, and conducting "the hearing in
such as way as to reduce as far as possible their feelings of intimidation and
inhibition."19
Furthermore, the ECHR held the sentencing of T. and V. violated the
European Convention, holding that the mandatory sentence of imprisonment
"at her Majesty's pleasure" required that a "tariff' be set to satisfy the require-
ments of retribution and deterrence. After expiration of the tariff, the prisoner
becomes eligible for release on license.20 In this case, the ECHR concluded
15 T. v. United Kingdom, 24724/94 ECHR (1999).
16 V. v. United Kingdom, 24888/94, ECHR (1999).
11 "No one shall be subjected to torture, or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
18 V v. United Kingdom, 24888/94 ECHR at 86.
19 Id. at 87.
20 Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1991, the Secretary of State determines both the
length of the defendant's tariff, and whether to release. The length of the tariff is determined
by a recommendation by the trial judge, the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice, and ultimately
[Vol. 6:749
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that the complex interventions by the Home Secretary (executive) who
increased the tariff recommended by the Lord Chief Justice (a move later con-
demned by the House of Lords, which concluded that the increased sentence
was based on the public uproar2 1) violated the requirements of both Article 6 to
have an independent court and Article 5(4) to be entitled to have the lawfulness
of indefinite detention decided speedily by a court.
Subsequent to the T. and V. judgments, the ECHR again addressed the
right of a child to participate effectively in his trial, pursuant to Article 6(1) of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
in the Case of S.C. v. United Kingdom.22 S.C. at the age of eleven was charged
with attempted robbery of an eighty-seven-year-old woman who was knocked
to the ground in an attempt to take her handbag. His fourteen-year-old co-
defendant stayed with the victim. S.C.'s defense was that he acted under
duress, being threatened by the fourteen-year-old. He was sentenced to a two-
year supervision order and placed with foster parents. One month later, the
Youth Court reviewed the defendant's history of delinquency, which included
robbery, burglary, theft, and arson, and concluded that he should be tried in the
(adult) Crown Court.
S.C.'s defense counsel obtained two expert reports: the first, from an ado-
lescent forensic psychiatrist who spoke to him for twenty minutes before S.C.
terminated the interview; and a second by a consultant clinical psychologist.
The reports included a full scale IQ of fifty-six, learning delays, impaired rea-
soning skills, conduct disorder of the unsocialized type, disrupted educational
career, cognitive abilities in the range of six years and two months to eight
years and two months, rather than his eleven years.
The Crown Court adjusted the hearing based on the child's age. The child
was accompanied by a social worker, was not required to sit in the dock, and
the court dispensed with wigs and gowns and took frequent breaks. The Crown
Court sentenced S.C. to two-and-a-half years' detention. He appealed on the
grounds that he had been deprived of a fair trial due to his age and impaired
intellectual ability, and gave new testimonial evidence by the social worker
who had been with him in Crown Court. The British court dismissed the
appeal, noting S.C. had made improvements in behavior and work while incar-
cerated, which therefore must be in his best interests.
Despite the special protections put in place by the trial judge,2 3 the Euro-
pean Court concluded that S.C. was unable to fully comprehend or participate
in the trial process and could not adequately give instructions. Although Arti-
cle 6(3)(c) does not require that a child understand every point of law or evi-
dence, effective participation "presupposes that the accused has a broad
by the Secretary of State. Criminal Justice Act, 1991, c. 53, § 35(2) (Eng.). See also Hus-
sain v. United Kingdom, 21928/93 ECHR 27-30 (1996).
21 A petition with thousands of signatures was submitted to the Lord Chief Justice demand-
ing that the children receive life sentences.
22 S.C. v. United Kingdom, 60958/00 ECHR § 4 (2004).
23 Following the T. and V. judgments, the Lord Chief Justice issued a practice direction
concerning the trial of children in the Crown Court, drawing upon the requirements man-
dated by the judgment. The practice direction was not in force at the time of the S.C. trial,
but the trial judge complied with many of the same safeguards.
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understanding of the nature of the trial process and what is at stake for him or
her, including the significance of any penalty that may be imposed."24 Partici-
pation must include understanding
the general thrust of what is said in court. The defendant should be able to follow
what is said by the prosecution witnesses and, if represented, to explain to his own
lawyers his version of events, point out any statements with which he disagrees and
make them aware of any facts which should be put forward in his defense.
2 5
In effect, the court in the S.C. judgment retrieves and breathes new life
into the decisions in T and V. by giving substance to the requirement that
children tried in adult proceedings must be able to effectively participate in
their trial. This human rights requirement is distinguished from the rigors of
proving "fitness to plead."'26 When the state determines to try a child in crimi-
nal court (as distinguished from a forum to determine the child's best interest
and those of the community), a child who is at risk of not being able to partici-
pate effectively in his trial because of his young age or limited intellectual
capacity, "it is essential that he be tried in a specialist tribunal which is able to
give full consideration to, and makes proper allowance for, the handicaps under
which he labours, and adapt its procedure accordingly. 27
Clearly, this 5-2 decision narrows the ability to try extremely young, inca-
pacitated, or emotionally- or intellectually-challenged children in adult criminal
court because such defendants must be able to effectively participate in their
trials.
Prior to the T. and V. cases and well before S.C., the ECHR addressed the
issue of life sentences for juveniles in the case of Hussain v. United Kingdom.
Here, a sixteen-year-old defendant was sentenced to detention during Her Maj-
esty's pleasure for the brutal murder of his two-year-old brother. The trial
judge wrote to the Secretary of State that the baby was covered with more than
sixty bruises and his brain and spine had been injured by considerable violence
over two to three days, referring to the defendant as "an unscrupulous young
liar ... probably a very dangerous young man who is quite unmoved by brutal-
ity .... I can do no more than sound this somber note of warning. '"28
It was eight full years after conviction that Hussain's tariff was set at fif-
teen years by the Secretary of State. After the expiration of the tariff, the
Parole Board reviewed Hussain's detention four times. He had been detained
for seventeen years when he brought the case to the ECHR asking for a declara-
tion that his rights had been violated pursuant to Article 5(4) of the European
Convention based on the failure to have his detention reviewed by a court-like
body and by the denial of an oral hearing where he could personally make his
case that he was no longer dangerous. The Government argued that the sen-
tence of detention during Her Majesty's pleasure was essentially punitive and
was automatic for juvenile murderers based on the gravity of their crime,
regardless of their mental state or dangerousness. In addition, it asserted that
24 S.C. v. United Kingdom, 60958/00 ECHR at 29.
25 Id.
26 "Fitness to plead" is a defense involving the incapacity of the child to distinguish right
and wrong. Id. at T 23.
27 Id. at T 35.
28 Hussain v. United Kingdom, 21928/93 ECHR 10 (1996).
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the acceptability to the public of an early release must be considered as an
element of maintaining public confidence in the system of criminal justice.2 9
The court concluded that a tariff is based on the requirements of both
retribution and deterrence, but that an indeterminate sentence for a juvenile
person, which could be a life sentence, could only be justified by dangerous-
ness and the need to protect the public. Indeed, the court noted that the failure
to take into account developments and changes that "inevitably occur with mat-
uration would mean that young persons detained... would be treated as having
forfeited their liberty for the rest of their lives, a situation which... might give
rise to questions under Article 3 . . . of the Convention."3° That is, a life
sentence for a juvenile offender might well violate the prohibition against tor-
ture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Hussain, the court unanimously concluded, is entitled to have the issue of
his continuing detention during her Majesty's pleasure reviewed by a court at
reasonable intervals and to appear in person at an oral hearing.
In Selcuk v. Turkey,3 decided this year, a unanimous ECHR found that
the failure of the authorities to take into account the age of the minor in contin-
uing pre-trial detention with adults was a violation of Article 5(3). Selcuk was
arrested for robbery of a computer from a primary school at the age of sixteen.
The judge ordered his detention with adults, which was challenged by his attor-
ney based on his minor status pursuant to Article 5(3) and, strikingly, pursuant
to Article 37(b) of the CRC. The ECHR agreed with the challenge to Article
5(3)32 noting that the child's attorney repeatedly brought to the attention of the
authorities that the client was a minor, and invoking Article 37(b) of the CRC,
she requested the court to release the defendant. "It appears from the case-file
that the authorities never took the applicant's age into consideration when
deciding on his continued detention."
33
Thus the ECHR notes approval of the use of the CRC in interpreting the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms when it comes to the continuing detention of a minor. The court
elevates the relevance of age as a consideration. At the same time, the ECHR
appears not to address the incarceration of the minor with adults, but only notes
it in a passing description of the facts of the case.
B. Violence Against Children
The ECHR addresses a range of cases involving violence against children
by state authorities, schools, private parties, and families. A growing jurispru-
dence articulates the special obligation of the state to protect the young and to
take age into account in determining the impact and consequences of violence.
Issues of gender and rape are being clarified, and traditional biases degrading
29 Id. at 1 49.
30 Id. at 53.
3' Selcuk v. Turkey, 21768/02 ECHR § 4 (2006).
32 "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.c of this
Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial." European Convention, supra
note 1, at art. 5(3).
33 Selcuk, 21768/02 at 35.
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girls and women are rejected. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is
cited as a basis for interpreting relevant Articles in the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 34 Cases range
from the torture, disappearance, and police rape of children to corporal punish-
ment in British boarding schools and parental neglect, and articulate the state's
clear obligation to provide due process to the parents of children alleged to be
in need of removal of parental authority and/or denial of access (visiting).
1. Torture/Rape
In the case of Aydin v. Turkey,35 the ECHR held for the first time that rape
by a public official of a person in custody amounts to torture. Aydin, a seven-
teen-year-old girl, was seized at her home by four security officials, along with
her father and sister-in-law, taken to the town square, blindfolded, and trans-
ported to the district gendarmerie headquarters. Aydin, who had never traveled
outside her village, was separated from her family, taken upstairs to a "torture
room", stripped, and put into a car tire and spun. Later, she was again stripped
and this time raped in a locked room and beaten for an hour. The gendarmerie
released her into the mountains four days later, and she made her way back to
her village, where she complained to the public prosecutor of the rape and
beatings.
Within a week, authorities sent Aydin to two doctors to establish whether
she was a virgin and if there were marks of physical violence or injury; the
results were inconclusive. The gendarmerie headquarters denied that she-or
anyone-had been in custody but declared that the "investigation" was ongo-
ing. The applicant married and left the jurisdiction, looking for work.
The ECHR concluded that to be raped by an official of the state is an
especially grave and abhorrent form of ill-treatment that amounted to torture
because it was deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering.36 Based on the hearings and investigations conducted by the Com-
mission, the court concluded that Aydin was held for three days; blindfolded; in
a constant state of physical pain, mental anguish, and apprehension; beaten;
paraded naked; and pummeled with high-pressure water.
Rape, the court noted, exploits the vulnerability and weakened resistance
of the victim, involves the acute pain of forced penetration, and leaves one
feeling debased, with deep psychological scars. The judgment, which never
refers to Aydin as a child, a girl, or even a female person, concludes for the first
time that "having regard to her sex and youth and the circumstances under
which she was held," the accumulation of acts of physical and mental violence,
and the especially cruel act of rape amounted to torture in breach of Article 3.37
Torture recognizes no exception, no derogation, even in the case of a pub-
lic emergency threatening the life of a nation or any suspicion, however well-
founded, that a person may be involved in terrorist or other criminal activities.
In addition, the majority concluded that there was a violation of Articles 6
and 13; the right to "a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
31 See, e.g., Pini v. Romania, 78028/01 & 78030/01 ECHR § 2 (2004).
31 Aydin v. Turkey, 57/1996/676/866 ECHR (1997).
36 Id. at I 78, 83.
31 Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
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independent and impartial tribunal established by law ' 38 was violated by the
absence of independent and rigorous criminal investigation, intimidation, and
lack of professional standards for taking medical evidence (noting that the
authorities were focused on the question of whether she was a virgin as
opposed to a rape victim). Further, Article 13 guarantees the availability at the
national level of an effective remedy to enforce the substance of the Conven-
tion, given the fundamental importance of the prohibition of torture and the
especially vulnerable. The dissent concluded that there was not evidence of
rape by authorities beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Rape/Consent
In M.C. v. Bulgaria,39 the ECHR concluded that the positive obligations in
Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention require the state to enact legisla-
tion to punish rape and to effectively investigate it. Here, M.C., a minor who
complained of rape, alleged that Belgian law prosecuted only cases of exces-
sive violence, determined lack of consent based on resistance rather than multi-
ple factors, and made children particularly vulnerable to rape since the age of
consent was fourteen. NGOs intervened to submit briefs on consent and girls'
and women's right to autonomy.
Conflicting evidence in M.C. led the state to not act for a year, to issue a
report that there was no evidence of rape, to re-open the investigation because
the first was not objective or thorough, and again closed the case for lack of
evidence. The ECHR noted that states have a margin of appreciation for cul-
tural differences in law, but are bound by the Convention. The ECHR recog-
nized the trend toward assessing consent based on multiple factors in rape
crimes, rather than relying on the level of resistance to force as the "constituent
element," and agreement by the Committee of Ministers that this development
was essential for the protection of women/girls.4"
The ECHR held the application of the rape law in Bulgaria was inconsis-
tent and almost exclusively involved significant force cases, that the investiga-
tion was too constrictive, and that the state's positive obligations under Articles
3 and 8 were to ensure that girls/women/children are not subject to ill-treatment
and are entitled to protection of their private life. The case turns more on
explicit issues of gender than of age or childhood.
3. Corporal Punishment
One of the most dynamic areas extending children's human rights is the
evolving protection of children from corporal punishment in three domains:
criminal corporal punishment by the state, corporal punishment in schools
(both public and private), and parental corporal punishment as reasonable chas-
tisement or punishment.
38 Id. at 91.
39 M.C. v. Bulgaria, 39272/98 ECHR § 1 (2003).
40 Id. at T 156. "[T]he Court is persuaded that any rigid approach to the prosecution of
sexual offences, such as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks
leaving certain types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardizing the effective protection of the
individual's sexual autonomy." Id. at 1 166.
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In Tyrer v. United Kingdom,4 ' the ECHR concluded that judicial corporal
punishment for delinquent crimes by an adolescent on the Isle of Man violated
Article 3's prohibition of degrading punishment-even though the "strokes"
had been reaffirmed in a democratic referendum by the population of the Isle of
Man. Tyrer was a fifteen-year-old arrested and convicted after a school fight.
The punishment of "birching," which raised welts on his skin, was adminis-
tered by authorities on his bare buttocks the same day the punishment was
announced. The ECHR held that while the punishment did not meet the level
of severity that amounted to torture or inhuman punishment, it did violate Arti-
cle 3's prohibition of degrading punishment. The judgment noted that all of
England, Wales, the rest of the U.K., and Europe had abolished corporal pun-
ishment of children as a judicial sentence for delinquency.
Thirteen years later, a closely divided ECHR (5-4) upheld the private
school "slippering" of a seven-year-old boy for talking in the corridor in Cos-
tello-Roberts v. United Kingdom.42 . Five years before this case, England had
abolished corporal punishment in public (independent) schools by removing the
defense of reasonable chastisement for teachers (1987); the brochure of this
private school gave parents notice only that the school believed in strict punish-
ment. Although the seven-year-old new student received three "whacks" on his
bottom through his shorts with a slipper, it was in the privacy of the headmas-
ter's office and with no evidence of severe or long-lasting effects. Costello-
Roberts concludes that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to
fall within Article 3 (citing Tyrer) and that the determination of a violation is
relative, depending upon all the circumstances of case.
Thus, the majority of the ECHR held that this school corporal punishment
did not reach the minimum level of severity to violate Article 3, although the
ECHR expressed "certain misgivings" about the automatic nature of the pun-
ishment for three demerits and the three-day wait before the "whack" was
administered.
The dissent pointed out that Europe and U.K. independent schools have
progressively outlawed corporal punishment, that the school gave no notice to
the mother and sought no consent from parents, and that the three-day delay
and the ritualized nature of the corporal punishment were of concern. Costello-
Roberts, the dissent concluded, was a borderline decision and not to be taken as
approval in any way of the retention of corporal punishment as part of the
disciplinary regime of a school.
In the case of A. v. United Kingdom, just seven years later, the ECHR
unanimously held that harsh parental corporal punishment of a nine-year-old
boy violated Article 3.43 Furthermore, by that time the U.K. had abolished
corporal punishment in all schools (1998). In this case, A.'s stepfather had
previously been reported to the child protection registry (when still a boyfriend
of the mother). He was charged with assault for beating A. with a garden cane
with considerable force on more than one occasion, but the court acquitted the
father based on the parental defense of reasonable chastisement or correction.
41 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 5856/72 ECHR (1978).
42 Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 13134/87 ECHR (1993).
43 A. v. United Kingdom, 25599/94 ECHR 19-21 (1998).
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The government of the U.K. asked the ECHR not to make a general state-
ment about corporal punishment of children but to limit the judgment to the
facts of the A. case. The U.K. accepted that the case of A. violated Article 3
and stated that its law providing for the parental defense of reasonable chastise-
ment must be amended. Yet the ECHR concluded that the U.K. failed to meet
its affirmative obligations under Article 3 by protecting A. and not holding
accountable the perpetrator of the assaults."
4. Child Abuse and Neglect: Parental Responsibility and Access
Haase v. Germany45 stands for the proposition that in cases of allegations
of parental unfitness or withdrawal of parental responsibility, parents must be
provided with fair procedures and involvement in the decision-making process
as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the required protection
of their interests in measures of interference with family rights pursuant to Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention.46 In Haase, the mother had twelve children-seven
with her first husband and five with Mr. Haase, including a seven-day-old
daughter. The Haases made an application for family aid, but then, as it turned
into an assessment of their family life, the Haases refused to cooperate with
authorities. An expert report resulted in an interim injunction withdrawing
parental rights over the seven children and authorizing the use of force if neces-
sary to remove them from their parents immediately. Without hearing from the
parents or the children, the district court adopted the expert report that the par-
ents' inability to provide care and education was an abuse of parental authority
and jeopardized the physical, mental, and psychological well-being of all the
children such that immediate separation and prohibition of access (visiting) was
the only way to protect them. The children were removed from different
schools, a nursery, home, and the hospital where the seven-day-old girl was
taken without the knowledge of the mother.
There followed numerous appeals, another expert, and a year later, inter-
views with the children, some of whom expressed a desire to return to their
parents and others who did not. The family pediatrician testified that the
" Note that subsequent legislation in the U.K. continues the conflict and turmoil. The
English Human Rights Act of 2001 retained the reasonable chastisement defense for parents,
but asked the courts to consider the effect, sex, age, health, and duration of the corporal
punishment. This law was widely criticized by the Committee on the Child and by child
welfare organizations. In 2005, Parliament approved the repeal of the reasonable chastise-
ment defense for parents but legitimized "smacking" of children by parents. United King-
dom Parliament, Joint Committee on Human Rights-Nineteenth Report, Part 4 (8 Sept.
2004), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtrights/161/
16102. htm.
41 Haase v. Germany, 11057/02 ECHR § 3 (2004).
46 The European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
European Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8.
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Haases were loving parents with a big family and that he had seen no signs of
violence or abuse.
The ECHR held unanimously that Germany violated Article 8 with its
interference in the Haases' right to family life. The ECHR sets forth a standard
at variance with current U.S. law and practice: taking a child into public care
should normally act only as a "temporary measure to be discontinued as soon
as circumstances permit, and ... with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural
parent and child."4 7
As to the law, a balance must be struck between the competing interests of
the individual and of the community as a whole, which includes a certain mar-
gin of appreciation-a margin that varies with the nature and seriousness of the
issues at stake. In emergency situations, the ECHR recognizes a wide margin
of appreciation, yet there must be circumstances justifying the removal, careful
assessment of the impact on the parents and the child, and the elimination of
possible alternatives to taking the child into public care.48 In particular, the
ECHR noted
the taking of a newborn baby into public care at the moment of its birth is an
extremely harsh measure. There must be extraordinarily compelling reasons before a
baby can be physically removed from its mother, against her will, immediately after
birth as a consequence of a procedure which neither she nor her partner had been
involved.49
Following removal of the children, even stricter safeguards are required for any
further restriction of parental authority and access.
The fair balancing of the interests of the parents and those of the child in
care includes the particular importance of the best interests of the child, which
may override the interests of the parent (for example, harming a child's health
or development). But, the ECHR emphasized, the proceedings must be fair and
assure that the parents "have been involved in the decision-making process,
seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite pro-
tection of their interests."50
The Court concluded that Article 8 was violated in that: (1) the risk of
harm was not adequately considered; (2) alternatives to immediate removal
were not explored; (3) the children were not heard; (4) the imminent danger
(urgency) was not established; (5) the removal of six children from their
schools, kindergarten, and home; placing them in unidentified foster homes;
and denying access to each other and parents was not proportionate; and (6) the
developmental harm to the children of separation was not explored. In harsh
and passionate language, the ECHR concluded that the initial removal was not
supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and the parents were not suffi-
ciently involved in the decision-making process to protect their interests. The
court called the removal of the newborn "Draconian" and noted the quality of
"irreversibility" of the separation.
Note that the remedy in such cases is both a monetary damage award and,
pursuant to Article 46 of the European Convention, the imposition on the State
47 Haase, 11057/02 ECHR at 93.
48 Id. at 90.
49 Id. at 91.
50 Id. at 94.
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of a legal obligation "to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to
redress so far as possible its effects,' subject to supervision by the Committee
of Ministers.
C. Family Law and Children's Rights
1. Adoption/Parental Rights
In Pini v. Romania,52 involving the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption53 , as well as the
European Convention and Romanian law, two Italian families each adopted a
girl from Romania. Both children had been abandoned at a young age and
were being cared for by a private institution for orphans, the Poiana Soarelui
Educational Centre in Brasov ("CEPSB"). The adoptive couples met the girls
at the institution when the children were approximately nine years old. The
adoption was ordered, appealed by the Romanian Committee for Adoption, but
the court rejected the appeal and entered final orders. There followed two years
of efforts by the adoptive parents to have the orders enforced, including send-
ing a bailiff to the orphanage door, and the filing a criminal complaint against
CEPSB, which was not prosecuted.
The children, now aged eleven, filed to have their adoptions revoked, with
the Director of the CEPSB as their guardian, arguing that they expressly wished
to remain in the family-like environment in which they were growing up and
being educated, and that they never met their adoptive parents nor do they
speak Italian. Intervenors, including the Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne,
a British national and rapporteur for the European Parliament, provided evi-
dence that the CEPSB was an excellent and family-like institution and that the
girls were well and personally cared for. At the same time, the Baroness's
report to the European Parliament on Romania's application for membership of
the European Union noted that the fate of Romanian children in institutions
remained a "major cause for concern and a problem in terms of fundamental
rights, with an impact on the accession procedure." 54 The Director of the
CEPSB was quoted in the media as saying that it was time "to stop exporting
Romanian children. 5 5
The ECHR found a violation of Article 8, noting that the Article must be
interpreted in light of the Convention on the Rights of the Child56 and the
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, as well the European Convention on the Adoption of
Children.
The ECHR concluded that the final order of adoption and the adoptive
parents' reliance established a relationship of family life and that that relation-
ship was violated by the failure of the national authorities to take the necessary
steps to implement that right. At the same time, the ECHR recognized the
51 Id. at I 115.
52 Pini v. Romania, 78028/01 & 78030/01 ECHR (2004).
53 Ratified by Romania on October 18, 1994. Id. at T 100.
54 Id. at 101.
55 Id. at 96.
56 Id. at 139.
Spring 2006]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
competing interests of the adoptive parents and the adopted children and firmly
put the expressed wishes of the children and the children's best interests ahead
of formal law. "There are unquestionably no grounds, from the children's per-
spective, for creating emotional ties against their will between them and people
to whom they are not biologically related and whom they view as strangers." 57
The best interests of the child will override the interests of the parents, and
"adoption is a means of providing a child with a family, not a family with a
child. ' 5 8 Once the children turned ten, their consent was required under
Romanian law, and the ECHR held that they are also entitled to have their
adoption order revoked once they reach that age. The court deplored the adop-
tion process, the lack of effective contact between the children and adoptive
parents before the adoption, and the absence of psychological support to pre-
pare the children for departure. It was remarkably forgiving, however, of the
lengthy proceedings and resistance to enforcing the adoption order, and in fact
explicitly noted the possibility of a fresh examination of the evidence at a later
stage when required. The children's consistent refusal to be adopted after
reaching the age of ten carried weight and led to the ECHR's conclusion that
there was no violation of Article 8.
Instead, the ECHR concluded that Romania violated Article 6(1)59 by fail-
ing to take effective measures to comply with final, enforceable judicial deci-
sions for more than three years. Noting with regret the "probably irreversible
consequences of the passage of time for the potential relationship between the
applicants and their adopted daughters," 60 the ECHR concluded that the now
thirteen-year-old girls remained strongly opposed to being adopted and moving
to Italy.
In the case of Gdrgiilii v. Germany,6' the ECHR tackled the vexing issues
of a case similar in ways to the Baby Richard 62 case in the U.S. The mother
gave the child up for adoption, the father attempted to locate the child and
obtain custody and access, and was denied and delayed over a period of two
years. The ECHR concluded that Germany violated Article 8 in regard to both
custody and access to the child by the father. Again, the court noted the operat-
ing principles: analysis of the case as a whole, whether decisions were relevant
and sufficient, the crucial importance of the consideration of the best interest of
the child, and the margin of appreciation for national authorities who have the
benefit of direct contact with all persons concerned (although the wide margin
of appreciation in matters of custody is replaced by a stricter scrutiny regarding
further limitations, such as access and legal limitations).6 3
Article 8 requires where there is the existence of a family tie, that the state
act to enable that tie to be developed, and it imposes the obligation to aim at
57 ld. at T 153.
58 Id. at T 156 (citing Frettd v. France, 36515/97 ECHR § 3 (2002)).
" Id. at 1167 (citing Art. 6 § I of the European Convention as providing for the right "to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal.").
Note that court found a violation by a 4-3 vote.
60 Id. at T 188.
61 Gorguhi v. Germany, 74969/01 ECHR 2004.
62 See generally In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Il1. 1995).
63 Gorgild, 74969/01 ECHR IT 41-42.
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reuniting a natural parent with his or her own child.64 In Gdrgdilii, the state
viewed separation from the foster family only as an instant separation, and the
state never pursued alternative strategies for making the transition feasible for
the child. Similarly, the suspension of access which diminished and progres-
sively destroyed the natural bonding possible between father and child also
violated Article 8.
2. Abduction (Parental)
In a series of cases involving parental child abduction during the course of
divorce and separation, the ECHR interpreted Article 8's right to family life in
light of the Hague Convention on Child Abduction. For example, in Iglesias
Gil and A. U.I. v. Spain,6 5 the mother sought return of her son from the father
who had taken him to the U.S. despite the mother being granted custody in
Spain where the child was born and where they lived. After lengthy proceed-
ings over a three-year period, the father returned the son but threatened and
attempted to blackmail the mother. The ECHR concluded that a breach of Arti-
cle 8 had occurred and that Spain's international efforts to locate and return the
child were not enough to protect the child. Citing Spain's ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ECHR awarded damages and
expenses.
Similarly, in Maire v. Portugal,6 6 the father had a child in France with a
Portuguese national, and a French court granted him custody of the child. The
mother took the child into Portugal and remained there with the child despite a
French court declaring a divorce, giving the father custody, sentencing the
mother to a year imprisonment, and issuing a warrant for her arrest. Portugal
was unable to locate the mother and child; however, the father located her in an
apartment in Portugal. After four years, the Portuguese police found the
mother and child, placed the child in a children's home, and issued the family
court judgment to the mother. On appeal, the decision was upheld, but further
appeals are pending.
The ECHR held that the obligation on states to take measures to reunite a
child with its parent is limited by the rights of the child, citing the CRC, and by
the refusal of the state to coerce parties into acting. Portugal, however, delayed
enforcement of the child's return, failed to sanction the mother, and demon-
strated a lack of urgency which was not in the best interests of the child, violat-
ing Article 8. The ECHR awarded damages.
In the emerging Hague parental abduction cases, cases of parents of differ-
ent nationalities have resulted in different countries making distinct and incon-
sistent determinations. In Sylvester v. Austria,67 the ECHR concluded that
there was a violation of Article 8 in an egregious case of state obstruction with
the Hague Convention. In Sylvester, the mother took the child from the father
and the country and state of origin (Wisconsin, where the child was born and
lived with the married parents) and returned to her parents in her Native Aus-
64 Id. at 45.
65 Gil v. Spain, 56673/00 ECHR (2003).
66 Maire v. Portugal, 48206/99 ECHR (2003).
67 Sylvester v. Austria, 36812/97 & 40104/98 ECHR (2003).
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tria. She remained in hiding and on the move with the child to avoid being
served with a court order of removal pursuant to the Hague Convention. Aus-
tria delayed enforcement of the judicial order, failed to sanction the abducting
parent, and created adverse conditions for the child's future relationship with
the father by the extreme delay and then by reversing their prior Hague order.
The ECHR's determination of violations of articles 8 and 6 and an award of
damages to the father seven years later seems hollow.
3. Visiting/Contact
Two Dutch cases of parental access, decided two years apart, were also
decided differently by the ECHR. In Yousef v. the Netherlands,68 an unmarried
Dutch mother would not allow the Egyptian national father to recognize the
child as his biological child,6 9 although he had been appointed auxiliary guard-
ian by the court. The father lived in the grandmother's home with the mother
and child for a year before returning to the Middle East for two-and-a-half
years. Upon return, the mother permitted him to see his daughter but refused
recognition.
The mother became terminally ill and made a will providing that her
brother would become the child's guardian. The father applied for recognition,
but the court rejected the application, noting that the name change accompany-
ing recognition would not be in the best interests of the child. In her final will,
the mother said that she did not want the father to visit. After her death, the
courts refused the father's request, on appeal determined that the mother's
interest terminated upon her death but that the decision regarding the father had
properly weighed the child's interests.
The ECHR held that there was a family life established between the father
and his daughter and that the state must act in a manner to enable the tie to
develop. The denial of his right to recognize his daughter interfered with the
right to respect for family life; however the law of the Netherlands called for a
"balancing" of interests. Thus, the interference was in accordance with
national law of the Netherlands. In addition, the Court noted there were more
than formal reasons for denying the father recognition in this case: no violation
of Article 8 had been established.
In Lebbink v. Netherlands,7" the court held the father of a child born out of
wedlock was an auxiliary guardian until the law abolished that position. For a
year, the father visited his daughter, but he did not seek official recognition in
deference to the mother's wishes. As the parental relationship deteriorated, the
father applied for access to visit, and the court appointed a Child Protection
Board to look at the circumstances of the child. Both the appellate and
Supreme Court held that no family life existed because the father never cohab-
ited with his daughter.
68 Yousef v. Netherlands, 33711/96 ECHR (2002).
69 Id. at 38 (explaining that in the Netherlands, the unmarried mother's wishes regarding
the child's name and whether the father is recognized as the biological parent are
determinative).
70 Lebbink v. Netherlands, 45582/99 ECHR (2004).
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The ECHR found that there can be an existing family life relationship
where the father is the birth parent and the child is born out of wedlock."' The
circumstances of each case must be analyzed, including the father's interest and
connection to the child. Although the father had not sought recognition and did
not live with his daughter, the Court held other factors present established a
relationship. In this case, the father's involvement in the early months of the
child's life and the father's role as auxiliary guardian created ties. The denial
of his request for access therefore violated Article 8. The dissent disagreed on
the facts that there was an established family relationship.
In Kosmopoulou v. Greece,72 the mother left her daughter and husband in
Greece and went to England. The father obtained custody, but upon the
mother's return, the mother obtained interim access. However, that order was
set aside. Three psychologists who examined the child (now, at the time of the
Greek case, nine years old) concluded that the child suffered from physical
negligence and abandonment by the mother and that keeping distance from the
mother would assist the child in suppressing her negative feelings.7 3 The child
also refused to stay with the mother and repeatedly refused to visit with her
mother. At one point, they were both brought to a local police station because
of the child's refusal to stay at the mother's house for a visit, and the mother
kicked the child and tore out clumps of her hair.
The ECHR held that the obligation not to interfere with family life
includes a margin of appreciation as well as regard for the best interests of the
child and her rights under Article 8." Further, the state must strike a fair bal-
ance among the sometimes competing interests of mother, father, and child.
The ECHR found a violation of Article 8 in Kosmopoulou because Greece sus-
pended the mother's visiting orders with her nine-year-old daughter at a crucial
moment, without hearing representations from the mother and without permit-
ting her to have access to the psychiatric report. "It is of paramount importance
for parents always to be placed in a position enabling them to put forward all
arguments in favour of obtaining contact with the child and to have access to all
relevant information which was at the disposal of the domestic courts."7 5 Ulti-
mately, the ECHR found that the mother's procedural guarantees were not in
effect, and therefore a violation of Article 8 had occurred.
The complex interplay of children's stated needs, the best interests of the
child, and parental rights to due process characterize the ECHR's efforts to
establish case law under Article 8.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: CASES FROM THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Unsurprisingly, the cases from the IACHR involving children focus more
on state violence against children and the failure of the state to protect children
than on private party disputes as to custody and access. The IACHR has been
71 Id.
72 Kosmopoulou v. Greece, 60457/00 ECHR (2004).
71 Id. at 1 16.
74 Id. at 42-50.
75 Id. at 49.
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hearing cases since 1978, twenty years less than the ECHR. Nonetheless, the
IACHR has produced an emerging line of children's rights cases that balance
complex interests with a powerful delineation of children's interests and needs.
A. Violence Against Children: Police
The first landmark children's rights case decided by the IACHR is known
as the "Bosques case," or the case of Villangrdn Morales v. Guatemala.7 6 The
abduction, torture, and murder of five young men (including seventeen-year-
old Anstraum Villagrin and two other children ages fifteen and seventeen) who
were street children in Las Casetas, a high crime area of Guatemala City, by
members of the Fifth National Police Corps in 1990 resulted in total impunity.
The accused were acquitted on all charges, and appeals were upheld. The
IACHR found that in the years following their deaths, the Guatemalan govern-
ment never undertook proper investigations or prosecutions. The court unani-
mously held that Guatemala violated the Rights of the Child (Article 19) as
well as Articles 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Arti-
cle 7 (Right to Personal Liberty), Article 8 (Right to a Fair Trial), and Article
25 (Right to Judicial Protection). The IACHR ordered reparations to be paid to
the families of the murdered children and youth, based on the individual situa-
tions of each family.
Three elements stand out in this case about the murder of street children7 7
by state agents and the subsequent impunity for the crimes. First, the IACHR
engaged in an explicit discussion of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
signed by Guatemala at the time of the Bosques murders but not then ratified.
The IACHR used the state obligations specified in the CRC to interpret Article
19 of the ACHR Rights of the Child provision.78 The Court concluded that the
state did not take adequate measures to protect street children, but rather made
them outcasts.
This incorporation of the subsequently-ratified CRC into the ACHR provi-
sion on the Rights of the Child illustrates the indivisibility of human rights
standards in the sense that it begins a process of integrating the provisions of
one international human rights treaty with another, in this case using the greater
depth of the CRC on matters involving children to interpret and give substance
to an article about children in an adult treaty, the ACHR. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, Villangrdn Morales expands enforceable substantive and procedural
rights for children, by incorporating the substance of the CRC into the individ-
ual right of petition in the ACHR. 79
76 Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. B) No. 63 (1999) (also known as the
"Bosques Case" or "Street Children Case").
71 See Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 32 at 13 (1997) (identifying
the murdered youths by name and age: Henry Giovani Contreras, eighteen, Federico Cle-
mente Figueroa-Ttinchez, twenty, Julio Roberto Caal-Sandoval, fifteen, Jovito Josu6 Jurez-
Cifuentes, seventeen, and Anstraum Villagrin, seventeen).
78 Article 19 provides: "Every minor child has the right to the measures of protection
required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state."
79 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 44,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, stating that "[a]ny person or group of
persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of
the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or
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Second, the petition was submitted by the parents of the murdered chil-
dren. The IACHR discussed the suffering and agony of the parents at several
points of the ruling and noted the torture of the street children (e.g., burns, eyes
gouged out, tongue cut out), the length of time between the abduction and their
deaths, and the humiliation and dismissal of the parents and families of the
deceased in the investigation, trials, and appeals within the Guatemalan legal
system. The principle remedy in Villagrdn Morales was reparations to the fam-
ily.80 At no point did the IACHR consider the limitations of the families or
their inability to protect their children during their lifetime.
Third, a noted Central American NGO, Casa Alianza, brought the case and
provided the team of attorneys. It took nine years to obtain a measure of jus-
tice. Casa Alianza worked to have the members of the police indicted and
tried, appealed the cases, brought in expert witnesses, challenged the evidence,
and ultimately brought the case to the international human rights system for a
ruling at the IACHR. This model of sustained NGO advocacy was required to
obtain the (delayed) justice of Villagrdn Morales.
Similar children's rights cases of abductions, beatings, torture, and murder
by police with subsequent impunity at the IACHR have continued and
expanded this line of findings of children's human rights abuses. Cases include
Nicaragua,8 Argentina, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. For example,
in Las Palmeras Case,82 the petition alleged that the Colombian National
Police force conducted operations in Las Palmeras around a school, where they
detained citizens, teachers, and workers; executed or tortured some of them;
and fired on students, dressing victims up in military uniforms. After seven
years, the state was still investigating the incidents. The IACHR ordered exhu-
mation of the bodies to determine the causes of death and concluded that
Colombia violated Articles 8 and 25. The court held that the Colombian judge
was not impartial and denied the next of kin due process, and that when the
state "fail[s] to convict and punish the responsible parties... [it] fosters impu-
nity."' 83 The Court concluded, "it is not enough that such [procedures] exist
formally; they must be effective."84
Bulacio v. Argentina85 involved a youth detained and beaten by police,
who then failed to notify the child's parents. Walter David Bulacio was repeat-
edly hospitalized due to his injuries and eventually died. After ten years of
complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party." The procedure requires that the
petition first go to the Commission, and only the Commission and States Parties may submit
a case to the Court. Id. at art. 61.
80 See reparations decision, Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77 at 11
57-64 (2001).
81 See Genie Lacayo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 30 (1997), The Lacayo case
involved a sixteen-year-old boy who was shot and died from loss of blood after he was left
on the side of the road after trying to pass a military vehicle in Managua. Id. at 12. The
Inter-American Court found violations of Article 8 (fair trial) due to hampering of the inves-
tigation (burning evidence, refusal of witnesses to testify, refusal to hear appeals, delays, and
lack of remedies for the family). Id. at 1 62, 63, 76, 97.
82 Las Palmeras Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 90 (2001).
83 Id. at 56.
84 Id. at 58.
85 Bulacio v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 100 (2003).
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criminal charges against the police captain, the Argentinian courts never
reached a decision. A human rights case was filed with the IACHR, and the
parties reached a friendly settlement in 2003, limiting the case at the IACHR to
the question of reparations to the next of kin. The IACHR held that Argentina
violated Articles 4, 5, 7 and 19 (Rights of the Child), as well as Articles 8 and
25, and concluded that Argentina must continue its investigation of the case,
enact preventive legislation, and pay reparations and legal fees to the victim
and next of kin.
In a subsequent case of "forced disappearance" of a fourteen-year-old boy,
kidnapped from his parents' home by members of the Guatemalan Army in
1981,86 the IACHR declared that Guatemala violated Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 17
(Rights of the Family), 19 (Rights of the Child) and 25 in the death of Marco
Antonio Molina Theissen. The IACHR ordered the state to pay reparations to
each family member (mother, deceased father, and three sisters) according to
their relationship, and ordered other actions as remedies for past violations.
This line of cases involving state violence against children continued in
the case of Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador (2 0 0 5 ), 8 7 where two young girls
were forcibly disappeared by soldiers, and their whereabouts remain unknown.
The IACHR concluded they could not hear the initial violation by state actors
because El Salvador had not yet availed itself of the IACHR's jurisdiction, but
it would hear the case on procedural and investigative defects that occurred
after the incident when El Salvador had accepted the Court's jurisdiction. The
state violated Articles 5, 8 and 25, due to the harm inflicted on the Serrano
Cruz sisters and their family by the defective investigation. 8
B. Violations of the Rights of Children in Detention; Incarceration with
Adults and Trial as Adults
In Minors in Detention v. Honduras,89 the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights ("the Commission")9  took up the unlawful detention of
juveniles in adult prison facilities. This case involved the unlawful arrest of
street children, orphans, and vagrants who were incarcerated in Tegucigalpa's
central prison and held in an adult facility, sometimes with approximately
eighty adult prisoners in each cell. The Commission found first, that taken
together, the provisions of the American Convention, Article 19 (Rights of the
Child), international treaties and rules, and the Honduran Constitution, Article
122(2) require the state to keep juveniles separate from adult inmates. Article
37 of the CRC provides that ".... every child deprived of liberty shall be sepa-
rated from adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do
86 Theissen v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 106 (2004).
87 Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 120 (2005).
88 See also Jean & Bosico v. Domincan Republic, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C.) No. 130
(2005).
89 Minors in Detention v. Honduras, Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 41/99
(1999).
90 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is the body to which appeals must go
prior to being heard by the IACHR. Commissioners are elected by all members of the
Organization of American States, including those who have not ratified the treaty.
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so .... ,,91 The Honduran Constitution provides that "[n]o juvenile under the
age of 18 shall be confined in a jail or a prison."9 2
Further, the Commission concluded that "Honduras has an administrative
practice of allowing children of both sexes under the age of eighteen to be
deprived of their freedom and confined to penal institutions for adults."9 3 A
Honduran Supreme Court ruling in banc initiated the practice when it adopted
the practice as a temporary measure to cope with rising juvenile delinquency
and lack of security at juvenile facilities. The Honduran Supreme Court
revoked their ruling on November 29, 1995, but the Commission concluded
that the general practice of detaining children together with adults had contin-
ued after the revocation. Rape, physical assault, and abuse of the detained chil-
dren had been well documented. Despite Honduras' assertion that the children
in adult prisons were being held separately from adults in those prisons, the
Commission concluded that
the practice of incarcerating minors under the age of 18 in adult penal institutions,
thus placing their physical, mental and moral health in serious peril, is a violation of
Article 19 of the Convention, which stipulates the obligation to provide special pro-
tection for children, a non-derogable obligation echoed in the Constitution and laws
of Honduras.
94
The Commission concluded that Article 5(5) taken together with Article
19 prohibits the state from housing detained minors in the same facility as those
housing adults. "[Mlinors shall be housed separately from adults, in other
words, in special juvenile facilities." 95 Citing abuse, beatings, sexual viola-
tions, and subhuman conditions, "[t]he Commission considers that the cohabi-
tation of juvenile and adult inmates is a violation of the human dignity of these
minors and has led to abuses of the juveniles' personal integrity. 96 Again, the
Commission took note of Article 37 of the CRC, concluding that the Honduran
practice of incarcerating children in adult prison facilities violated the duty to
provide special protection to children.
In addition, the state of Honduras violated Article 7 of the American Con-
vention by failing to guarantee the non-criminalized children's right to personal
liberty and right to be free from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. In a
strongly-worded opinion, the IACHR stated that children who are abandoned,
orphaned, or vagrant cannot be incarcerated simply because they are at risk and
that incarcerating them constituted a serious violation of human rights. Chil-
dren may not be "protected" by the state by being deprived of their liberty.
Minors in Detention cites Article 39 of the CRC, the Beijing Rules, 97 the
Riyadh Guidelines,98 and the Havana Rules, 99 as well as Article 37 of the Con-
vention of the Rights of the Child ("[t]he arrest, detention or imprisonment of a
9' CRC, supra note 6, at art. 37.
92 Minors in Detention, Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 2.
93 Id. at 76.
94 Id. at 98.
95 Id. at 125.
96 Id. at 130.
97 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
("Beijing Rules"), G.A. Res. 40/33, 1.1-1.3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985).
98 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency ("Riyadh Guide-
lines"), G. A. Res. 45/112, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/112 (Dec.14, 1990).
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child shall ... be used only as a measure of last resort").'O° In summary, the
IACHR identifies a clear tendency in international human rights law to-provide
greater protection to minors than to adults and to limit the role of punishment.
"This is why States are required to afford them greater guarantees in the event
of their detention, which should only be an exceptional measure."' '
Here, as well as in Villangrdn Morales, decided by the IACHR the same
year, the IACHR affirmatively asserted its duty to refer to "other international
instruments that contain even more specific rules regarding the protection of
children."' 10 2 Citing Article 29 of the American Convention, the IACHR
affirmed the use of a "combination of the regional and universal human rights
systems for purposes of interpreting the Convention.""0 3
Importantly, the Commission held that Honduras violated Article 8(e) of
the American Convention by failing to provide the right to a public defender to
the incarcerated juveniles if they had not engaged private representation.
Again, the Commission read the American Convention in conjunction with
Article 37(d) 10 4 and Article 40°5 of the CRC.
Finally, the Commission held that one of the principal rules of interna-
tional law in the matter of children's rights is the prohibition against prosecut-
ing children as adults. Citing Article 5(5) of the American Convention,
requiring the state to bring minors "before special tribunals, as speedily as pos-
sible, for trial,"'0 6 the Commission held that there is an obligation to create a
special jurisdiction "which shall be the only court competent to prosecute
minors."'0 7 The Commission concluded that the Honduran Constitution, Arti-
cle 122, taken together with Article 19 of the American Convention's obliga-
tion to provide special protection for children results in distinct and specialized
jurisdiction for juvenile justice.
Five years later, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found similar
human rights violations against Paraguay 0 8 , where conditions at juvenile
detention facilities subjected the children to inadequate conditions. The chil-
dren's detention system of Paraguay was overpopulated, had poor health care,
lacked infrastructure, and had insufficient competent staff. Following fires in
the facility that killed twelve students, the state dispersed the remaining chil-
dren throughout the adult penitentiaries, even those not yet sentenced, and sep-
arated them from their families. The IACHR held that the state of Paraguay
violated international law and standards, including Articles 2, 4, 5, 8 and 25 of
99 United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, G. A. Res.
45/113, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990).
100 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 6, at art. 37.
1o' Minors in Detention, Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 113.
102 Id. at 72.
103 Id.
1" CRC, supra note 6, at art. 37(d) ("Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have
the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance.").
105 Id. at art. 40(2)(b)(iii) (stating that a child has the fight "[t]o have the matter determined
without delay by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair
hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance").
106 Minors in Detention, Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 99.
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 Children's Rehabilitation v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 112 (2004).
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the American Convention, and violated the children's personal integrity and
judicial rights, and the Court ordered reparations to the families.
IV. INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BY
NATIONAL COURTS
Harold Koh, now Dean of Yale Law School, has written that the enforce-
ability of international human rights law depends on the establishment of a set
of norms, the formalization of those norms into a structure, the legal ratification
and acknowledgement of international standards, and most effectively, the inte-
gration or absorption of international standards into domestic law.109
In that regard, it is worth noting that nations as distinct as South Africa,
Canada, and the United States have decided children's rights cases with refer-
ence to international human rights law and the cases discussed above. These
three examples are a modest selection of such integration or domestication of
children's human rights into national law.
Perhaps most remarkably, the new Constitutional Court of South Africa
("Constitutional Court") has issued judgments in a series of children's rights
cases involving the right to housing, the right to health care treatment, and the
right to be free from judicial corporal punishment. In State v. Williams,11° the
Constitutional Court reviewed the long history of the abolition of judicial whip-
ping and beatings throughout the world, reviewed international law and treaties,
and then analyzed the new South African Constitution, drawing in large part on
human rights standards. The Constitutional Court concluded that children have
the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and that
corporal punishment as a sentence for criminal activities by minors will no
longer be constitutional.
In Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada,"l l
the Canadian Supreme Court took up the issues of both school and parental
corporal punishment of children. Under scrutiny was Article 43 of the Crimi-
nal Code which provided a defense of reasonable chastisement to assault
charges where the parent or person in the position of parental authority used
reasonable force as an instructional measure.1 12
The Supreme Court concluded, almost without discussion, that corporal
punishment by teachers was not constitutional but created a patchwork of crite-
ria for reasonable chastisement by parents. For example, the Canadian
Supreme Court prohibited the hitting of a child under the age of two, disabled
children, and children over the age of twelve (since adolescents respond to
physical force with anger and violence). The Court similarly forbade hitting a
child with an implement or about the head or face. In the course of its analysis,
109 See Harold Hongshu Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397 (1999).
110 State v. Williams, CCT/20/04 Const. Ct. S. Africa (1995).
l Can. Found. for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada., 1 S.C.R. 76 (2004).
112 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. C-46, s. 43 (1985) ("Every schoolteacher, parent or
person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force by way of correction
toward a pupil or child, as the case may be, who is under his care, if the force does not
exceed what is reasonable under the circumstances.").
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the Canadian Supreme Court noted the trend toward abolishing corporal pun-
ishment of children altogether, citing ECHR cases and commentary by the
Committee on the Child.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons" 3 engaged in a surprising
four-page discussion of international law and human rights standards, the law
of other nations, and the law of England and Wales in regard to the execution
of juvenile offenders. While not determinative, the U.S. Supreme Court noted
international treaties, law, and practice is "instructive" of our own laws and
traditions, particularly regarding an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment as indicated by "evolving
standards of decency.""' 4
V. CONCLUSIONS OF COMMON LAW ANALYSIS JURISPRUDENCE BY
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS
The cases discussed in this article are a mere sample of the rich array of
case law being developed by international human rights courts in the arena of
children's rights. Several remarkable steps have been taken, almost without
commentary. First, cases involving children as petitioners, victims and subjects
are being brought to the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights in increasing numbers. Second, the regional trea-
ties that provide the basis for jurisdiction are being interpreted and expanded
through the analytical use of other international human rights treaties and laws
involving children-treaties for which there is no individual right of petition.
Thus courts draw upon the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction to give
substance and content to the rights of the child to protection, safety, survival,
family life, and regard for the dignity of the person embodied in the general
language of the regional treaties. Third, age, gender, and developmental com-
petence are being deemed relevant factors in deciding violations of human
rights. Fourth, children's right to participation, their right to be heard, and their
right to express their opinions are being acknowledged, recognized, and ele-
vated in the courts' analyses. Fifth, the body of jurisprudence is becoming a
form of common law, distinguishable on the facts but relied upon both for
principles of law and for methodological analysis.
Finally, in the contested zone of parental rights and children's rights, the
careful balancing of competing interests is undergoing interesting develop-
ments. Both the ECHR and the IACHR recognize the margin of appreciation
due to the nation state and its legal traditions and procedures. Both give great
weight to the particular rights of family life and parental ties to and interest in
their children. It is increasingly noted that states have the obligation to assure
that parents must be given a full right to participate in and have access to rele-
vant information and have timely decision-making when their parental interests
in recognition, custody, access, enforcement, and decision-making are
involved. Parents' interests prevail over state convenience, cost, or frustration.
13 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
114 Id. at 563.
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At the same time, giving meaning to "best interests of the child" is being
steadily, if cautiously, approached. Children's best interests trump parent's
interests in the balance. Children's ability to participate must be negotiated.
Children's wishes must be heard and taken into account, with due regard to
their age and development. Children have a right to know and have access to
their parents. They have a right to protection against the harshness of adult
law, incarceration, institutions, and a right to special protection against
violence.
Perhaps this somewhat capricious array of human rights decisions by
regional human rights courts will provide a spark to encourage children's law-
yers in the U.S. to look to developments at the ECHR and the IACHR for
standards, concepts, and trajectories that will strengthen the rights of children
in families.
